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ABSTRACT: Plato builds an ontology capable of saving the Phenomena in the Sophist. By doing so, 
he distances himself from Parmenides. This article analyses the children's prayer (Soph. 249 d 5) in 
order to sustain this thesis and evaluate the platonic proposal, along with the role of the negation and 
the heteron in the communication of the Kinds.
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RESUMO: Platão constrói uma ontologia capaz de salvar os fenômenos no diálogo Sofista.  Fazendo 
isso,  distancia-se de Parmênides.  Este artigo analisa a passagem conhecida como “a demanda das 
crianças” (Soph. 249 d 5) com o intuito de sustentar essa tese e avaliar a proposta platônica, através do 
papel da negação e do heteron na comunicação dos gêneros.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: ontologia, fenômenos, heteron, negação, synanphotera 
Introduction
In this paper I analyse and evaluate Plato’s attempt to save the phenomena through an 
historical  and  theoretical  analysis  of  Plato's  Sophist.  It  is  common  knowledge  that  the 
Timaeus is taken as a point of reference concerning cosmology (Heisenberg1 himself regarded 
Plato as the predecessor of modern and contemporary physics). However, I have chosen to 
refer to a theoretical dialogue,  the Sophist, which is intended to highlight the analysis of an 
ontological  proposal.  While  in the Timaeus,  Plato  provided  (mathematically  speaking)  a 
mechanical interpretation of the universe connected with the theory of forms2 in his attempt to 
save the phenomena, in the Sophist he tried to build a new sense for the Being and the non-
Being.  
In spite of Parmenides’ rigorous denial of the change, the Eleatic visitor vindicating 
Change and Changelessness for what it is: ‘the task of the true philosopher is to defend the 
1Heisenberg, 1953,  pp. 137-140. 
2Brisson, 2005,  pp. 20-21 . 
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thesis that both the Being and the All consist of Changeless and Change (Plato, Soph. 249 
D5)’.  Plato  pretends  to  save  the  ever-changing  phenomena  along  with  the  Truth,  which 
according to the same platonic philosophy needs stability.
Being conscious of those who look down on us3 and hold too much contempt against 
the crowd we form part, he wishes to save the multiplicity existing in the world.
Will this attempt be accomplished? Which kind of ontology must be built? Has Plato 
reached his goal?
The context
In  the Sophist  242  c-249d,  Plato  offers  a  strident  critique  of a  pair  of  extreme 
positions. The first position analyses a quantitative question about the Being: ‘is the Being 
one or many?’ However, the second position analyses a qualitative question: ‘is the Being the 
same thing as the body or is just something ideal?’  Therefore, he criticizes the Pluralists 
(known as Dualists) and the Unitarians who denied multiplicity; he levelled fierce criticism 
against those who only believe in perceptible and material objects (‘the sons of the earth’) and 
also against those who only perceive the world through ideas (‘the friends of the forms’). The 
sons  of  the  earth  support  a  motion  being,  whereas  the  friends  of  the  forms  believe  in a 
motionless being.4  
According to some scholars5 Plato himself was considered as “a friend of the ideas”. It 
is precisely in the Sophist where he would overcome this position (after the great criticism 
against the ideas as separate entities to be found in the first part of the Parmenides), which 
expresses  clearly the  ontology of  the  middle  dialogues,  particularly the Republic and  the 
Phaedo.  Indeed,  Plato  goes  beyond  the  very separation  among  ideas  and  sensible  things 
requested by the theory of the ideas (or theory of forms), conferring the concept of movement 
within the field of the Being.
In the children's prayer (249d5), Plato wishes the same changeable beings were stable 
so  as  to  not  being  reduce  to  mere  appearance  like  in  Parmenides’ philosophy  (a  view 
developed by Plato’s lecture). Thanks to a literary analysis, it will be possible to highlight the 
particular relevance of the expression ‘children's prayer’.  The prayer refers to auspice: the 
3Plato, Soph. 243 A. 
4See Palumbo, 1994, p.p. 73-94, for an interesting attempt to go any more deeply into the theory of the Being  
before Plato. 
5For a bibliographic reconstruction:  See de Rijk, 1986, p. 102. 
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platonic desire of fulfilling the prayer’s requirements along with the necessity of help (even a 
celestial one!) in order to obtain his requests.
I also would like to draw the attention to the fact that this prayer is made by children, 
which consequently applies to naivety (in the Greek world only the elderly are regarded as 
wise), and likewise to the youth’s courage and reckless behaviour attached to their wish to 
perform something new and against traditions (i.e. the Parmenides’ philosophy).
This prayer invocated by children must become the aim of the true philosopher.
The similarity between the philosopher and the child is of such relevance that will call 
the Greek conception of wisdom into question. However, if we do take into consideration 
child psychology, we can understand their negation of the non-contradiction principle in their 
capacity to imagine contradictory and conflicting worlds; yet this controversy is not possible 
in Parmenides’ philosophy, which is based in a non-controversy6 principle. The children also 
represent the greed, wanting to grasp everything. In the present case: both the motion and the 
rest.
As a consequence, Plato’s attempt may be compared to an impossible prayer. But all 
the same, he challenges the impossible, and with the creation of a newborn ontology makes 
possible what is considered to be impossible by the Parmenides’ tradition. That is precisely 
what a true philosopher must do!
Plato is not a child thinking in a contradictory way but a courageous and reckless 
young man who leads a battle7 against tradition (Parmenides) in order to conquer a new non- 
contradictory sense of the Being and the non-Being.
The Plato's challenge
In order to be able to keep together the Rest and the Motion, the Sensible and the Idea, 
the  Difference  and the  Sameness, Plato,  through  the  Eleatic  visitor,  studied  the  relation 
among: Being, Change, Changelessness, Sameness and Difference (the most important kinds). 
He also instituted the difference between the concept of absolute non-being, that cannot be 
said neither thought, and the concept of relative non-Being, that in some sense also 'is'8.
The  kinds  of  Being,  Change  and  Changelessness  which  come  from  previous 
investigations about Plato’s predecessors are related with the first part of the argumentation. 
6Regarding  the  presence  of  the  principle  of  non  contradiction  in   Parmenides’ philosophy,  see  specially 
Severino, 2005,  Tarca, 2001. 
7Note here that the literary analysis allows us to get one of the philosophical meanings of the numerous war 
images appearing in the dialogue. 
8Plato. Soph. 257 b 1. 
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The  aforementioned  connection  (Change  and Changelessness  are  not  equal)  gives  rise  to 
another two concepts: the Sameness and the Difference. Each one of them is equal to itself  
and  different  from the  others.  By this  communication  of  kinds  (megista  ghene),  we  can 
appreciate how everything takes part of the Being and the Different.  
The  Being  is  a  definite  gender  composed  of  a  finite  number,  while  the  Different 
(which represents the  relationality of the reality) is a gender composed of infinite elements. 
For instance, although the movement is different from the being at the same time participates 
of  the  Being.  Thus,  it  is  the  Being  and  the  non-Being  at  the  same  time.  This  diverse 
relationship shows us a non-contradictory meaning concerning the Being. We are dealing with 
a determined non-being that appears in the relationship. One example might be: the Change is 
different from the Changelessness and consequently, it is not the Changelessness; the Change 
is different from the Identical, and thence it is not the Identical but ‘participates’ of the Being. 
The determined non-Being is something: it is a Being. 
Therefore,  the  main  achievement  of  overcoming  the  position  of  “the  father” 
Parmenides is to distinguish between the two senses of non-Being. In the Sophist, the Being 
becomes each determination of what it is  thanks to the relational power of the determined 
non-Being. The Being comprises the to on but does not comprises the indeterminate einai (as 
does the Parmenides' Being). 
Only by the two senses of the non-Being, Plato accomplishes the foundation of the 
differences. The concept of the relative non-Being (heteron) represents every single being that 
is different from another as well as the diversity present in the relation that makes possible the 
differentiation within the Being. This differentiation constitutes the essence of every being 
and makes it different. 
Not  only does  the ontology of  communication  of  kinds  emancipate  itself  from an 
absolute non-Being, but it  also liberates itself  from the pure absolute Being.  Moreover,  it 
asserts the Participation and denies any identification with the einai.
Nevertheless,  there  is  still  the  identity  of  the  to  on which  affirms  that  everything 
represents its own self (the Changelessness is the Changelessness and thence participates of 
the Being). From a non-Being point of view, the denial of the non-Being stands against the 
Being (as stated by Parmenides) and the affirmation of the non-Being stress on the concept of 
diversity  as  a  relationship:  the  Changelessness  is  not  the  Change;  the  Changelessness  is 
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different from the Change. Therefore, the relationality as an intentional potency (dynamis9) 
constitutes the main theoretical discovery of the dialogue, and so it founds the new meaning 
of the Being and the non-Being. This also has value at an ontological, gnoseological, and 
linguistic level. However, in the Theaetetus, the relationality is understood as an interrupted 
motion,  which  makes  impossible  the  Knowledge.  10.  The Sophist answers  the  questions 
proposed in the Theaetetus through a different conception of dynamis that is attributed to the 
relationships capabilities of the Being. This conception brings order and at  the same time 
maintains the movement, rather than being immediately attributed to the Phenomena.
The school of Marburg has strongly emphasized the cognitive and predicative value of 
the communication of kinds. The predicative character of this theory appears clearly at the 
conclusion of his exposition ( Soph. 259 a 5-6, 262 d 8-9) with a particular emphasis on the 
speech as one of the genders of the Being, being itself a relationship, or rather a combination 
of names and verbs, which in turn derive from the combination of vowels and consonants. 
The same narrative framework (the possibility of uttering falsehoods and thus the possibility 
to define the Sophist) which constitutes the perfect justification to analyse the Being and the 
non-Being and manifests the gnoseological and predicative meaning of the Theory. Moreover, 
taking into account the subject of the conference, I shall now concentrate on its ontological 
value.
Plato’s solution centres on three main points (1) to bring motion to the ideas, through 
the  communication  of  the  Kinds  (according  to  some  scholars11:  even  inside  the  ideas 
themselves), (2) to bring rest and stability into the sensible world (transmitting the idea as 
paradigm), and (3) at the same time, incorporate multiplicity (attributable to the relational 
figure of the heteron) and unity (attributable to the ideas).
Plato performs the foundation of the differences and saves the physis using this new 
sense of Being and non-Being.
The heteron as relational being
The non-Being is not the contrary (enantion) of the Being but the different (heteron). 
The  latter  will  be  analysed  and set  out  as  the  one  which  relates  everything  through  the 
negation.  In the Sophist, Plato proposes a new meaning for the non-Being. And although it 
does  not  have  the  characteristics  of  the  absolute  non-Being,  which  possess  the  power  of 
9See: Gonzales, 2011, pp. 63-95.
10See: Ambuel, 2007, p.p. 113-117.
11For a reconstruction of the problem, see: Fronterotta,  2007, pp. 9-135. 
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"making disappear", it is something that "shows". To quote Heidegger12,‘non-Being “shows” 
by means of relation’.  Relationality allows us to discern the traces of B in A and the traces of 
A in B. The Sophist, therefore, gives to the non-Being a relational status. The infinite relations 
of  the  Being through  the  heteron are  the  pollakos mentioned  by  Plato  in  the Sophist. 
Relationships are logical; they have a linguistic aspect along with an ontological one. Being is 
not just one, but many, in the same way that reality has a dialectical structure.13 
Which is the role played by the negation in this relational structure? Which kind of 
identity emerges by the negation? A relation connects two things. Something is different only 
in relation to something else: a difference (pros heteron, 255 d 1). 
It is always a diversity from the diversity itself (ton heteron heteron  255 d 6-7); by 
rejecting the identity between the Two, gains its own identity of everything: A is A because is 
"non non-A" (double negation). In this way, the non-Being discovered by Plato becomes a 
relational non-Being or we might even call it: a Being that institutes relations by negation.
From an ontological point of view, the heteron cannot be considered as a relative non-
Being in the sense of a stage of the Being which finds itself in the middle (metaxy); between 
the  absolute  Being  and  the  not-absolute  Being14.  In  the  Sophist,  Plato  formulates  a  new 
ontology, excluding Parmenides’ absolute concept of the Being and the non-Being. Moreover, 
he defines the new coessential characteristics of the Being and the non-Being in the figure of 
the potency and the relationality.
One and the other (synanphotera)15
In order to save the phenomena, Plato establishes an ontology that I will define as ‘one 
and the other’.  This poses many hypothetical questions: (a)  what do we need to save the 
Phenomena? (b) Do we need a material level or an ideal level? (c) Do we need the Being or 
the non-Being? (d) Do we need Change or Changelessness? (e) Do we need Sameness or 
Difference? All these questions would be answered by Plato saying: ‘one and the other’. 
The  ontology of  the  synanphotera represents  the  children's  prayer  entirely:  ‘I  am 
begging for “one and the other”: this and that’.  More than thirty years ago Jacob Klein16 
12Heidegger, 1997, pp. 386-389. 
13See especially  Sasso, 1991, p.p. 81-29, about the systematic structure of relationships among the Kinds. 
14See the Neoplatonic tradition.
15I have underlined the synanphotera (“one and the other”) within the context of the Sophist, although Diotima 
underlines the  oute-oute (“Neither-Neither”) in the  Symposium.  In my opinion, both expressions refer to the 
exclusion of isolated logic and tend to emphasize the relational aspect. 
16Klein, 1977, p. 60.
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proposed an interesting research about the expression  ‘one and the other’, appearing in the 
Sophist. Klein wondered why this expression was so frequently used. He counted up to 32 till 
259D, and thereafter another two times, reaching a total amount of 34 reappearances in the 
whole dialogue (6 in the first part and 28 in the second one). Klein’s answer is based on the 
dual  nature  of  the  Being,  the  intentional  nature  of  the  Different  and  the  nature  of  the 
Intelligible.
On the whole, I personally agree with the essence of Klein’s ideas, yet there is a more 
simple reason from which the answers of Klein could come as specifications. Plato wanted to 
establish a new image of the physis as a correlation of the Ideal, namely, a novel cosmology 
able to manifest a rule of stability and truth in the same forthcoming phenomena17.  Actually, 
he suggested an ontology capable of supporting the theory of forms by solving the related 
problems induced by chorismos18. 
From a logical point of view, Plato does not claim the coexistence of contradictions 
but that of the contraries.  Being and Not-being are not opposed as enantia, their opposition is 
an antithesis. For instance, it is possible for Socrates to be neither good nor bad, but he must 
be either good or not good. Therefore, it can be concluded that Plato through the ontology of 
the ‘one and the other’ has not denied the non-contradiction principle.
Has Plato met the challenge?
This is not an easy question to answer because encompasses a lot of intricate questions 
stratified not only in the history of modern western Philosophy, but also in the history of 
science, physics and mathematics.
One may say that each philosopher has been looking for a different answer to the 
problem given by Plato, either for or against it. We can affirm, therefore, that the great merit 
of Plato was offering us a masterly question along with the answer. 
From a theoretical point of view, Plato’s answer looks interesting to me provided that 
the platonic ontology would represent a dual  relationality instead of a dualistic opposition 
(this is what I have try to demonstrate in this article).
Taken the platonic ontology as a starting point, a different way from both dualism and 
monism can be considered. This way will be able to combine unity and multiplicity through a 
17See Plato's Timaeus. 
18A relevant conclusion  about the image of the physis can be drawn from the reading of  the article proposed in 
the Sophist. Obviously the interlacement between the Being and the non-Being has another repercussions. For 
instance, to give reason for the existence of forgery. See Palumbo, 1994, p.p. 67-73.
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dynamic and relational Being.  The revaluation of the platonic ontology is fertile even from 
the point of view of the history of the philosophy. In recent years, some attempts have been 
made  to  prove  that  the  platonic  philosophy  is  not  dualistic,  neither  from  the  onto-
gnoseological point of view nor from the ethic-anthropological point of view.
My personal contribution to the matter, aimed to prove the repercussions caused by the 
relational ontology on the  physis’ image, belongs to this hermeneutic line. Therefore, it  is 
possible to understand and be aware of the physis in a non contradictory way, thanks to the 
dynamis of the Being, by the proposal of an ontology capable of enlighten the relationship 
between the sensible world and the ideal world.
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